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Abstract
Open-economy macroeconomics contains a monetary model in the
Keynesian tradition that is deemed serviceable for analyzing the short
run and a nonmonetary neoclassical model thought capable of handling
the long run. But do the Keynesian and neoclassical models meet the
challenges thrown out by the main events of the past few decades—the
’80s shock to Europe from the sharp increase of external real interest
rates; the kind of speculative shock experienced in the U.S. and parts
of northern Europe in the second half of the ’90s: the prospect of new
industries emerging in the future with needs for new capital; and what
may have been an important shock in the U.S.: the large Kennedy cut
in income taxes in 1964? We first indicate that the effects of these
shocks on the open economy are not well captured by either the stan-
dard Keynesian model or the standard neoclassical theory. Next we
provide a careful development of a nonmonetary model of the equilib-
rium path of the real exchange rate, share price level, as well as natural
output, employment and interest that contains “trading frictions” of
the customer-market type. We then examine its implications for the
above kinds of shocks not only over the medium run but over the short
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run and the long run as well. The structuralist model we develop also
provides an explanation for the dollar’s weakening and accompanying
decline in U.S. employment from early 2002 to late 2004 (and predic-
tion of subsequent recovery) resting on belated apprehensions over the
scheduled explosion over future decades of Medicare and Social Secu-
rity outlays for the baby boomers and alarm over the large tax cuts
enacted in spite of this prospect. (JEL E24; F3; F4)
Keywords: structuralist model; share price; real exchange rate; em-
ployment
In open-economy macroeconomics there is a monetary model in the
Keynesian tradition that is deemed serviceable for analyzing the short run
(Robert Mundell, 1962, 1963; Rudiger Dornbusch, 1976, 1980) and there
is a nonmonetary neoclassical theory thought capable of handling the long
run (Olivier Blanchard and Stanley Fischer, 1989; Joa˜o Ricardo Faria and
Miguel Leo´n-Ledesma, 2000).1 For years the weak point in this arsenal was
agreed to be the medium run (Edmond Malinvaud, 1994, 1996). This run,
which follows the short-run adjustment of production, hiring and training,
advertising and other investment rates, is a period of adjustment for the
various business assets, such as customers and trained employees as well
as plant, during which nationals’ private wealth holdings and social enti-
tlements are regarded as constant—a period we will think of as emerging
in the second year following a shock and running for half a decade or so.
By now, several dynamic nonmonetary models of a “structuralist” possess-
ing such a medium run have emerged (Edmund Phelps, 1988a, 1988b; Hian
Teck Hoon and Phelps, 1992; Phelps, 1994; Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth
Rogoff, 2000). At present, though, the structuralist models tend to be seen
as niche products offering no competition to the established short-run and
long-run models.
But do the Keynesian and neoclassical models meet the challenges thrown
out by the main events of the past few decades? We suggest that the effects
1Carlos Rodriguez (1979), in addition to studying the short-run effects, also studies
the long-run effects of monetary and fiscal policies in an open-economy Keynesian model
under flexible exchange rates where the stock of foreign assets has fully adjusted to the
stream of induced short-run international capital flows. This approach, however, suffers
from the weakness that it assumes nominal wage or price-level stickiness even in the long
run.
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of these shocks on the open economy are not well portrayed by either the
standard Keynesian model or by standard neoclassical theory. (We rele-
gate to the appendix the key equations underlying the Dornbusch-Mundell-
Fleming model and the standard competitive neoclassical model that form
the basis of our following discussion.) Consider the ’80s shock to Europe:
an external jump in real interest rates. The Dornbusch-Mundell-Fleming
model and its descendants, applied to fluctuating-exchange-rate economies
such as the U.S., EU and Japan, predict that a rise in the overseas interest
rate interacts with the home country’s supply of liquidity, or LM curve, to
cause a release of liquidity fuelling an increase of output and employment;
in the usual extension, employment would gradually be forced back to its
fixed natural level. Neoclassical theory would depict interaction of the in-
terest rate increase with the supply of labor, in particular, it would show
that a higher external real interest rate leads to an increase in the current
marginal utility of wealth and thus a drop in the demand for leisure and
hence an increase in the work week and possibly an increase in labor force
participation. In fact, European employment went into a huge decline in
the ’80s and by 2000, nearly 20 years later, unemployment rates had hardly
recovered at all except in those countries that caught the internet boom of
the late 1990s or implemented economic reforms.2
Consider next the sort of shock experienced in the U.S. and parts of
northern Europe in the second half of the ’90s: the emerging prospect of new
industries in the future creating increased needs for capital—as a macroeco-
nomic approximation, an anticipated future shift in the productivity param-
eter (see Phelps and Gylfi Zoega, 2001). The Dornbusch-Mundell-Fleming
model could only represent such an event as an increase in the marginal
efficiency of investment, thus a shift of the IS curve, but such a disturbance
2In defense of the open economy Keynesian model, one might argue that in response
to the higher external real interest rate in the first half of the ’80s, Europe contracted
money supply in order to fend off inflationary pressures, and thus produced a rise in
unemployment. However, for such an endogenous response in monetary policy to actually
cause a recession, Europe would have had to experience real exchange rate appreciation
according to the Dornbusch-Mundell-Fleming model. (This is readily proved with the
Dornbusch-Mundell-Fleming model set up in the appendix.) Data, in fact, show that
Europe faced real exchange rate depreciation in the first half of the ’80s (see Jean-Paul
Fitoussi and Phelps, 1988, Table 2.1 and Rogoff, 2002, various figures).
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would appreciate the currency by so much as to leave little or no rise in
domestic interest rates and consequent release of liquidity, thus little or no
rise in gross domestic output and employment.3 Neoclassical theory would
depict a decline in the current marginal utility of wealth and thus a jump in
the demand for leisure, in parallel to a jump in consumer demand, and hence
a decrease in the work week and possibly a decrease in labor force participa-
tion. In fact, from 1996 to 1999 or 2000, employment zoomed without rising
inflation, the labor force clearly rose, and hours per employed person inched
up, at least in the U.S. and, it appears, in the other booming economies too.
Finally, consider what may have been a major shock of the ’60s: the
large Kennedy tax cut, mostly the reduction in income taxes, enacted in the
U.S. in 1964.4 The Keynesian models implied that such a tax cut, in causing
a real exchange rate appreciation, might fail to expand output through a net
stimulus to aggregate demand but it might still be expansionary by reducing
the costs of imported intermediary goods. Neoclassical theory suggested an
expansion through the tax cut’s impact on the supply and demand for labor.
In fact, the U.S. showed no significant real appreciation—there was at first
a mild depreciation and subsequently a recovery of the exchange rate—and
the labor force did not appear to rise more than might have resulted from
the decline of the unemployment rate. The fact that the unemployment did
decline over the decade suggests that other mechanisms or channels may
have delivered the famed expansion ; aggregate demand cannot be excluded
(since there was no appreciation), but the decline of inflation at mid-decade
speaks somewhat against heavy reliance on that channel.
We think that this somewhat disappointing performance of the Key-
nesian and neoclassical approaches should impel a closer look by macroe-
conomists into the behavior of the relatively new structuralist models to
3A more sophisticated characterization of central bank policy in response to the upward
shift of the IS curve for a large open economy like the U.S. could produce the high output
and employment that we observed in the ’90s. According to that more sophisticated
Keynesian model, however, the high output and employment should have led to wage and
price inflation, and we had surprisingly little of that. We believe that the structuralist
model we develop here helps with that puzzle.
4Personal income taxes were cut by more than 20 percent. The marginal personal
income tax rates, which ranged from 20 to 91 percent before the cut, ranged from 14 to
70 percent as a result of the Revenue Act of 1964.
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which we have referred. And since this third kind of model is dynamic, or
intertemporal, a careful development of such a model provides the opportu-
nity to compare its implications not only over the medium run but for the
short run and the long run as well. Here we will develop more fully than
has been attempted so far the small open-economy version of the customer-
market model, first introduced by Phelps and Sidney Winter (1970) and ex-
tended in a general-equilibrium way in several papers since then (Guillermo
Calvo and Phelps, 1983; Nils Gottfries, 1991; Paul Krugman, 1987; and
Phelps, 1994). (In the appendix, we show how the model can be modified
to the case of a large open economy.) The result is a nonmonetary model of
the equilibrium path of the real exchange rate, share price level as well as
natural output, employment and interest based on trading frictions in the
goods market.5
Our model also provides an explanation for the dollar’s weakening and
decline in employment since early 2002 and predicts a subsequent recovery
that is centered around the epochal event hanging over the present situa-
tion: the explosion over the next few decades of Medicare and Social Secu-
rity outlays for the baby boom generation. In any surprise-free scenario, or
equilibrium path, the expectation of this future fiscal burden causes the U.S.
current account to go into surplus until the period when the baby boomers
are exercising their huge medical and pension claims, during which the cur-
rent account jumps into deficit (see Phelps, 2004). The logic is that the
nation will do outsized saving in the early years to make room for the huge
bulge of Medicare and Old Age Survivor and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
claims that lie ahead. The dollar must weaken enough to shift the current
account balance from today’s deficit not just to a sustainable deficit level but
to the needed surplus. In contrast, the Dornbusch-Mundell-Fleming model
predicts that an anticipation of a future increase in government transfer
payment leads to a current real exchange rate appreciation and a temporary
recession. The aggregative neoclassical model with its assumption of zero
trading costs lacks the richness to study the behavior of the real exchange
5Charles Engel and John Rogers (2000) show empirically that nominal price stickiness,
in conjunction with fluctuating nominal exchange rates, alone is not sufficient to explain
why real exchange rates fluctuate so dramatically. Trading frictions in goods markets are
also empirically important.
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rate. Our explanation of the recent dollar weakness also contrasts with that
of Blanchard, Francesco Giavazzi and Filipa Sa (2005) who argue that the
dollar’s weakness since 2002 is due to the current huge accumulated external
liabilities of the U.S. requiring the running of large trade surpluses to service
the interest on debt.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we present some heuris-
tics. Then, in Section II, we develop and study the properties of a model
suitable for a short-run and medium-run analysis. For concreteness, we
think of a medium run here as a period during which nationals’ holdings of
net foreign assets are constant.6 (The justification is that wealth will not
change by enough, and soon enough, to influence greatly the early responses
of the jumpy variables and the growth or decline of the customer stock.)
More precisely, as we will be examining the four shocks discussed above un-
der the simplifying assumption that the small open economy in question is
initially neither a net creditor nor net debtor, the level of nationals’ holdings
of net foreign assets held constant in the short- and medium-run analysis
is zero. We will establish conditions under which a unique perfect foresight
path exists in a 3×3 dynamic system with the stock of customers as a slow-
moving variable. (The full 4 × 4 dynamic system that takes full account
of the influence of changes in the holding of net foreign assets on the two
jumpy variables of the system is treated in the appendix.) We then move
on to apply the model to analyze four economic shocks: an expectation of a
future step-increase in the level of Harrod-neutral productivity parameter;
an increase in the exogenously given world real rate of interest; a permanent
balanced-budget cut in the wage income tax rate; and an expectation of a
future wage income tax rate increase required to finance increased entitle-
6The short cut that we take in the main text (the general case is treated in the ap-
pendix) is analogous to that taken in closed-economy macroeconomics in its study of
short and medium-run dynamics, where the influence on the dynamic system of the im-
plied change in the stock of physical capital resulting from a change in the level of net
investment is ignored. In that system, if we take into account that an exogenous increase
in investment spending (a rightward shift of the IS curve given the LM curve) results in
a higher stock of physical capital, the rise in the real interest rate would be attenuated.
Similarly, in our system, if we take into account the fact that an increase in the holding of
the stock of net foreign assets raises the required domestic interest rate through a wealth
effect, the extent of any real exchange rate depreciation is also attenuated.
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ment spending. Section III then turns to the long run, where the levels of
net foreign assets held by nationals adjust fully. Some concluding remarks
are contained in Section IV.
I. Some Heuristics
The model we present here can be thought of as providing a general-
equilibrium characterization of two familiar diagrams in standard microe-
conomics: an imperfectly competitive product-market diagram and a Mar-
shallian labor-market diagram. With firms possessing some positive degree
of monopoly power, a wedge is driven between the price and marginal cost—
a mark-up that is greater than one—in the product-market diagram. We
will show that in our open-economy customer-market model, the size of the
mark-up is a function of two important variables, the share price level and
the real exchange rate. An increase in the share price level makes it more
worthwhile for the firm to reduce current mark-ups in an effort to increase
the current customer base. Additionally, an increase in the real exchange
rate (a real exchange rate appreciation) makes international competition
more intense and also acts to encourage firms to reduce their current mark-
ups.
The decline in the optimal mark-up due to a rise in share price level and
real exchange rate appreciation is translated in the Marshallian labor-market
diagram as a rightward shift of the labor demand curve as the marginal
revenue product at any given level of employment is increased. Juxtaposed
against an upward-sloping wage-setting curve, this implies that increases in
share price levels and real exchange rate appreciations cause an expansion
of equilibrium employment. Is there any empirical evidence to support this?
In Hoon, Phelps and Zoega (2005), we conduct formal empirical tests that
give some support to the theory developed here.
Figure 1 shows the cross-sectional relationship between the stock market
capitalization-GDP ratio and the employment rate of several OECD coun-
tries. A clear positive relationship is visible. Figure 2 depicts the relation-
ship between the real exchange rate (an increase means a real appreciation)
and the employment rate in a cross section of the same OECD economies. A
real exchange rate appreciation appears to go hand in hand with higher em-
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ployment rates. Though not perfect, the relationship is surprisingly strong
(correlation is 0.68). This simple graph is indicative that the relationship
between real exchange rates and employment may be more involved than
the textbook version of the open-economy Keynesian model would lead one
to believe. Our aim in this paper is to develop a model that makes elevated
share price levels (suitably normalized by aggregate productivity levels) and
strong real exchange rates important predictors of strong employment per-
formance.
II. The Model in the Short and Medium Run
In the product market, firms use domestic labor only to produce for a
global customer market. Initially, the firms’ stock of customers currently
equals the population of nationals. The size of the domestic labor force,
which is also the initial stock of customers at domestic firms, is a positive
constant, both belonging to a population in a demographic stationary state.
We normalize the size of the domestic labor force to one. The number of
domestic firms is also taken to be fixed, and the firms are all in identical (or
symmetrical) circumstances. The characteristic of the customer market in
the Phelps-Winter model is the informational frictions that would impede
a quick flow of customers to a firm were it to choose to post a lower price
than that being charged elsewhere. A firm setting a price always below that
set by the other (identically behaving) firms would only gradually drain
customers from its competitors. Symmetrically, it is supposed that a firm
setting a price always above that set by the others would see an equally
gradual erosion of its customer stock, as customers sought alternative sup-
pliers (including foreign suppliers) and required varying lengths of time to
find them. This is our way of modelling “trading costs,” which Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2000) argued to be essential for explaining a number of puzzles in
open economy macroeconomics. The Law of One Price, accordingly, can be
violated temporarily in equilibrium even for traded goods though it holds
in steady state (Engel, 1999). This is because one country’s producers may
price their goods more expensively than those of another at the price of a
loss of market share over time.
In the labor market, our firms, while collectively beneficiaries of infor-
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mation imperfections in the product market, are victims of imperfect infor-
mation in the workplace. At each firm the members of the firm’s work force
suffer randomly timed and statistically independent episodes of shirking.
Workers are able to shirk without certainty of being caught because moni-
toring is expensive and the firms cannot afford continuous monitoring. But
given that the firm can monitor costlessly at times when the opportunity
presents itself, workers know that an act of shirking will be detected with
some positive probability. Consequently, a worker of given accumulated as-
sets will succumb to the urge to shirk with less frequency the greater the
opportunity cost of being caught and hence dismissed. The effort rate is
increasing in the real wage offered by the firm where the worker is currently
employed, vi, decreasing in wage-income prospect of persons in the unem-
ployment pool proxied by the product of the employment rate (that is, one
minus the unemployment rate) and the expected market wage, (1 − u)ve,
and decreasing in the worker’s average independent income, yw. (Note that
if we conceive of the wage rate as real wage—measured in domestic con-
sumer goods, say—the corresponding average nonwage income yw should
be thought of as real nonwage income after nonwage transfers and nonwage
taxes.7) Making the convenient assumption that firms have the identical
distribution of employees by age and wealth, so that there is nothing special
about one firm’s employees, and assuming that the effort rate is homoge-
neous of degree zero in the three arguments, we can simply write the effort
function as ²((1− u)ve/vi, yw/vi). We assume that ²1 < 0, ²2 < 0, ²11 < 0,
²22 < 0, and ²12 < 0. The assumptions that ²11 < 0 and ²22 < 0 ensure
that the second-order conditions are satisfied while −²12 > 0 means that the
marginal effect of raising the real wage on effort (given (1 − u)ve) is lower
the higher is the nonwage income.
A firm can combat the shirking propensity of its workers by offering an
increased wage, raising it above the market-clearing level. As firms generally
adopt the strategy of paying above-market-clearing wages, the same wage
at the individual firm confers a reduced advantage—labor input and hence
7When we later consider a reduction in lump-sum transfer payment to match the per-
manent wage income tax cut, we will see that as the decrease in lump-sum transfer payment
reduces the after-transfer nonwage income, the efficiency wage needed to minimize unit
cost is also reduced. The transfer payment adds to nonwage income on the assumption
that the worker receives it from the government whether or not he is or will be employed.
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output costs more—so unemployment arises. For labor-market equilibrium,
ve at any given 1 − u is just large enough that, for all i, vi = ve: none
of the identical firms sees an advantage in offering a still-higher wage to
further reduce shirking. This apparatus delivers the well-known wage curve
portraying the equilibrium wage as rising with 1−u. We would remark that
other models of the wage curve exist, for example Christopher Pissarides
(2000), which suitably formulated, would permit the same results that we
obtain. We now develop the supply side of the model in the form of the
labor-market equilibrium before turning to study the product and capital
markets.
A. The Labor Market
Let the ith firm’s output zi be given by Λ²ni, where Λ is the index of
Harrod-neutral productivity level and ni is the number of the firm’s em-
ployees. For costs to be at a minimum at any given employment level,
the wage at the ith firm must be high enough to minimize the ratio of
its wage, vi, to effort at the firm, ²((1 − u)ve/vi, yw/vi). The minimiza-
tion problem at such a firm may be described as c¸i= min [vi/(Λ²((1 −
u)ve/vi, yw/vi))] by choosing vi. With the labor force a constant, the num-
ber of persons supplied to the labor market per firm is a constant, ns. If
n is the average employment at the other firms, then u is approximately
(ns−n)/ns. The optimal choice of vi yields the generalized Solow elasticity
condition:
−
[
(1− u)(v
e
vi
)(
²1
²
) + (
yw
vi
)(
²2
²
)
]
= 1.(1)
Labor-market equilibrium and the similarity of firms imply that vi =
v = ve. Under these conditions, (1) simplifies to
−
[
(1− u)(²1
²
) + (
yw
v
)(
²2
²
)
]
= 1.(2)
Noting that the first and second arguments in the effort function are now
given by 1 − u and yw/v, respectively, we infer from (2) that v/yw is an
increasing function of 1− u:
∂( vyw )
∂(1− u) =
[2²1 + (1− u)²11 + (ywv )²21](y
w
v )
−2
2²2 + (1− u)²12 + (ywv )²22
> 0.
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We write
v
yw
= Φ(1− u); Φ′(1− u) > 0.(3)
In the absence of any taxes and transfers, and recalling that we are
holding the level of net foreign assets constant at zero for a short- to medium-
term analysis, a suitable normalization of the fixed number of firms at one
implies that yw + (1− u)v ≡ Λ²[1− u]. Then, using (3), we obtain
yw ≡ Λ²[1− u]
1 + (1− u)Φ(1− u) ,
whence c¸ ≡ v/(Λ²) = (v/yw)(yw/(Λ²)) = [(1− u)Φ(1− u)][1 + (1− u)Φ(1−
u)]−1. Hence, the unit cost c¸ is a monotone increasing function of the
economy-wide employment rate, 1 − u. Now if we limit ourselves to sit-
uations where increased output would require increased employment (and
so excluding the case where the effect of reduced unemployment on effort
might swamp the effect of having more persons at work), we make z a mono-
tone increasing function of 1− u.8 Noting that z = Λ²[1− u] ≡ csx, where
cs is the output supplied per customer and x is the total stock of customers,
we can write c¸ = Υ(csx/Λ); Υ′(csx/Λ) > 0.9 Hence the firm’s unit cost, c¸,
is increasing in aggregate output (relative to the measure of productivity),
and there may be said to be rising “industry cost” despite constant cost
at the individual firm through the wage and shirking effects of increased
employment.
B. The Product Market
Our objective here is to develop a model of the small open economy
in which all firms, foreign and domestic, operate in a market subject to
informational frictions. In the case we are examining here, initially all the
relevant customers of national firms—firms that produce only with national
labor—are nationals. Although the small open economy is too small to affect
perceptibly the world real rate of interest, by definition, disturbances to the
8The mathematical condition is that (1− u)²1 − (1− u)²2Φ−2Φ′ + ² > 0.
9The intermediate step to prove this is to use the relationship ²(1 − u,Φ−1)[1 − u] ≡
csx/Λ. Since 1 − u is increasing in csx/Λ under our assumption, and c¸ is increasing in
1− u, hence c¸ is increasing in csx/Λ.
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demand of its national customers will certainly be felt by national firms,
and so will the exchange rate and the real interest rate in terms of the good
supplied by national firms and their price.
With regard to the ith firm, we let xi, a continuous variable, denote (the
size of) its customer stock; let csi denote the amount of consumer output it
supplies per customer; and let pi denote its price, say, in units of the domestic
good.10 We will let p denote the price at the other domestic firms and pe
the price that the firm and its customers expect is being charged by other
domestic firms (all measured in units of the domestic good). We introduce
a variable pˆ, where pˆ−1 tells us how many units of the domestic good must
be given up in exchange for one unit of the foreign good. Consequently, an
increase in pˆ is a real exchange rate appreciation.
In product-market equilibrium, by definition, every firm and its cus-
tomers have correct expectations about the other firms, that is, p = pe. With
their expectations thus identical in product-market equilibrium, the identi-
cally situated domestic firms will then behave alike, so that pi = p = pe.
A firm, in maximizing the value of its shares, has to strike a balance
between the benefits of a high price, which are increased revenue and reduced
cost, thus increased profit, in the present, and the benefits of a low price,
which are an increased profit base in the future as customers elsewhere
gradually learn of the firm’s price advantage. The key dynamic is therefore
the law of motion of the firm’s customer stock,
dxit
dt
= g(
pit
pt
, pˆt)xit; g1 < 0; g11 ≤ 0; g2 < 0; g22 ≤ 0; g(1, 1) = 0.(4)
The joint assumption that g1 < 0 and g11 ≤ 0 means that the marginal
returns to price concessions are nonincreasing, in the sense that successive
price reductions of an equal amount by firm i yield a nonincreasing sequence
of increments to the exponential growth rate of customers. The inequality
g2 < 0 implies a gain of customers at the expense of foreign suppliers when
the real exchange rate depreciates though successive weakening of the real
exchange rate yields a nonincreasing sequence of increments to the exponen-
tial growth rate of customers since g22 ≤ 0. What the sign of g12 is relates
10Expressing all prices in terms of the foreign good would not substantively alter the
analysis.
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to the question of what the effect of foreign competition on domestic firms’
market power is. Suppose that pˆ < 1 so there has been a real exchange
rate depreciation, hence foreign goods are selling at a premium. Then each
identically situated domestic firm is increasing its market share at the ex-
pense of foreign suppliers. In such an environment, a reduction in pi, given
p, can be expected to generate a smaller increase in the rate of inflow of
customers compared to a situation where pˆ > 1 (and each identically sit-
uated domestic firm is losing customers to foreign suppliers). Since stiffer
foreign competition (higher pˆ) confers a higher marginal return to a price
concession, firm i is induced to go further in reducing its markup, holding
other things constant. In our theory, therefore, the assumption that g2 < 0;
g22 < 0 taken alone or jointly with g12 < 0 implies that an appreciation
of the real exchange rate will lead to lower domestic markups and hence
increased output supplied due to the increased competition that domestic
producers face from foreign suppliers.
The representative firm has to choose the price at which to sell to its
current customers. Raising its price causes a decrease, and lowering the price
an increase, in the quantity demanded by its current customers according
to a per-customer demand relationship, D(pi/p, cs), where cs in this context
is set equal to the average expenditure per customer, cd, at the other firms.
For simplicity, we assume that D(·) is homogeneous of degree one in total
sales, cs, and so we write csi = η(pi/p)cs; η′(pi/p) < 0; η(1) = 1. Each firm
chooses the path of its real price or, equivalently, the path of its supply per
customer to its consumers, to maximize the present discounted value of its
cash flows. The maximum at the ith firm is the value of the firm, V i, which
depends upon xi:
V i0 ≡ max
∫ ∞
0
[
(
pit
pt
)−Υ(c
s
txt
Λ
)
]
η(
pit
pt
)cstx
i
t exp
−
∫ t
0
rsds dt.
The maximization is subject to the differential equation giving the motion
of the stock of customers of the ith firm as a function of its relative, or
real, price and the real exchange rate given by (4) and an initial xi0. The
current-value Hamiltonian is expressed as[
(
pi
p
)−Υ(c
sx
Λ
)
]
η(
pi
p
)csxi + qimg(
pi
p
,
pi
p∗
)xi,
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where qim is the shadow price, or worth, of an additional customer and p
∗ is
the price charged by the foreign supplier expressed in our domestic currency.
(In symmetric equilibrium, pi = p and pˆ ≡ pi/p∗ = p/p∗.) The first-order
condition for optimal pi is
η(
pi
p
)
csxi
p
+
[
(
pi
p
)−Υ(c
sx
Λ
)
]
η′(
pi
p
)
csxi
p
+qim
[
g1(
pi
p
,
pi
p∗
)
xi
p
+ g2(
pi
p
,
pi
p∗
)
xi
p∗
]
= 0.(5)
Another two other necessary first-order conditions (which are also sufficient
under our assumptions) from solving the optimal control problem are:
dqimt
dt
= [rt − g(p
i
t
pt
,
pit
p∗t
)]qimt −
[
(
pit
pt
)−Υ(c
s
txt
Λ
)
]
η(
pit
pt
)cst ,(6)
lim
t→∞ exp
−
∫ t
0
rsds qimtx
i
t = 0.(7)
We now show that “marginal q” denoted qim is equal to “average q,”
which we denote as qia ≡ V i/xi. Taking the time derivative of the product
qimx
i, we obtain
d(qimtx
i
t)
dt
= qimt[
dxit
dt
] + xit[
dqimt
dt
]
= g(
pit
pt
, pˆt)qimtx
i
t + [rt − g(
pit
pt
, pˆt)]qimtx
i
t −
[
(
pit
pt
)−Υ(c
s
txt
Λ
)
]
η(
pit
pt
)cstx
i
t
= rtqimtx
i
t −
[
(
pit
pt
)−Υ(c
s
txt
Λ
)
]
η(
pit
pt
)cstx
i
t,
which we can integrate and then use (7) to obtain
qimtx
i
t =
∫ ∞
t
[
(
pik
pk
)−Υ(c
s
kxk
Λ
)
]
η(
pik
pk
)cskx
i
k exp
−
∫ k
t
rsds dk ≡ V it .
Hence, qim = q
i
a = q
i.
Equating pi to p, and setting qi = q, delivers the condition on consumer-
good supply per firm for product-market equilibrium:[
1 +
η(1)
η′(1)
−Υ(c
sx
Λ
)
]
= −( q
cs
)
(
g1(1, pˆ) + pˆg2(1, pˆ)
η′(1)
)
; η(1) = 1.(8)
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The expression in the square brackets is the algebraic excess of marginal
revenue over marginal cost, a negative value in customer-market models as
the firm supplies more than called for by the static monopolist’s formula for
maximum current profit, giving up some of the maximum current profit for
the sake of its longer-term interests. An increase in q (the unit value of the
business asset) means that profits from future customers are high so that
each firm reduces its price ( equivalently its markup) in order to increase its
customer base. Hence lower prices in the Phelps-Winter model are a form of
investment, an investment in market share. Note also the role played by the
real exchange rate (pˆ). If stiffer foreign competition leads to reduced market
power of domestic firms, then a higher pˆ leads domestic firms to increase
their output even further beyond the point where current marginal revenue
equals marginal cost as dictated by a static monopolist. This channel is
present if either g22(1, pˆ) < 0 or g12(1, pˆ) < 0.
From (8), we can express consumer-good supply per customer relative to
productivity, cs/Λ, in terms of q/Λ, pˆ, and x, that is, cs/Λ = Ω(q/Λ, pˆ, x).
It is straightforward to show that 0 < eq/Λ ≡ d ln(cs/Λ)/d ln(q/Λ) < 1, epˆ ≡
d ln(cs/Λ)/d ln pˆ > 0 and −1 < ex ≡ d ln(cs/Λ)/d lnx < 0, where ej denotes
the partial elasticity of cs/Λ with respect to the variable j. As explained
before, an increase in q makes investments in customers through reducing the
markup attractive and so expands output. An increase in pˆ, that is, a real
exchange rate appreciation causes markups to decrease as domestic firms
face stiffer competition from foreign suppliers and hence increases output
and employment. Finally, with rising marginal costs, an increase in the
number of customers at each firm leads to a less than proportionate decline
in the amount of output supplied per customer. Noting that we can express
the markup, say µ, as being equal to 1/c¸, we can also say that our theory
implies that, for given x, the markup is inversely related to q/Λ and pˆ so we
write µ = m(q/Λ, pˆ), m1 < 0 and m2 < 0.
C. The Capital Market
Finally we sketch the mechanisms of saving, investment and asset valua-
tion in the capital market. Households have to plan how much of income to
save, putting their savings in domestic shares; any excess is invested overseas
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and any deficiency implies the placement of shares overseas. Firms have to
plan their accumulation of customers, issuing (retiring) a share for each cus-
tomer gained (lost); any excess of customers over the domestic population
implies some customers are overseas and any deficiency means that foreign
firms have a share of the market. Since the stock of customers, hence shares,
is sluggish, the level of the share price must clear the asset market.
In a symmetric situation across firms, (6) simplifies to
[1−Υ( csxΛ )]cs
q
+
q˙
q
+ g(1, pˆ) = r,(9)
where a dot over a variable denotes its time derivative. This equation in the
firm’s instantaneous rate of return to investment in its stock of assets, which
are customers, is an intertemporal condition of capital-market equilibrium:
it is entailed by correct expectations of q˙, r and pˆ at all future dates. We
will make the assumption that initially the shares issued by domestic firms
are all held by nationals.
Drawing upon the Blanchard-Yaari model of finite-lived dynasties sub-
ject to exponential mortality, it is argued that the economy here satisfies
an Euler-type differential equation in the rate of change of consumption per
customer, cd. Consumption growth is governed by the excess of the interest
rate over the rate of pure time preference, denoted ρ, and by the ratio of
(nonhuman) wealth, denoted W , to consumption. Upon setting customers’
consumption per customer equal to the output supplied to them per cus-
tomer, cs, we obtain
dcst
dt
= (rt − ρ)cst − θ(θ + ρ)Wt,(10)
where θ denotes the instantaneous probability of death and W ≡ qx here.
In requiring here that q at each moment be at such a level as to make the
path of planned consumption (its growth as well as its level) consistent with
the path of output from (8), we are requiring that the market where goods
are exchanged for shares (at price q) be in equilibrium. No household will
find the prevailing share price different from what is expected.11
11From (10), we obtain an expression giving us the consumer’s required rate of interest:
r = ρ + θ(θ + ρ)(qx/cs) + (c˙s/cs). By noting that cs/Λ = Ω(q/Λ, pˆ, x), we can further
replace (c˙s/cs) by eq/Λ(q˙/q) + epˆ( ˙ˆp/pˆ) + exg(1, pˆ).
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Finally, for international capital-market equilibrium with perfect capital
mobility, we must satisfy the real interest parity condition, which states that
any excess of domestic real interest rate, r, over the exogenously given world
real rate of interest, r∗, must be met by an exact amount of expected rate
of real exchange depreciation. This equation is:
r = r∗ −
˙ˆp
pˆ
.(11)
Equations (8) to (11) give us four equations in the four variables: cs/Λ,
q/Λ, pˆ, and x. However, using the relation cs/Λ = Ω(q/Λ, pˆ, x) derived
from (8), we can reduce the system to three dynamic equations in the three
variables: q/Λ, pˆ, and x, the last being a slow-moving variable. We proceed
to do the necessary substitutions to obtain and analyze the 3× 3 dynamic
system, showing the conditions under which a unique perfect foresight path
exists.
D. The 3× 3 Dynamic System
The dynamics of the system can be described by the behavior of the
endogenous variables q/Λ, pˆ, and x after substituting out for cs/Λ using
cs/Λ = Ω(q/Λ, pˆ, x):(
q˙
q
)
=
[
1 + epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
f(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x) +
[
epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
h(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x),(12) (
˙ˆp
pˆ
)
=
[
1− eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
h(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x)−
[
eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
f(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x),(13) (
x˙
x
)
= g(1, pˆ),(14)
where
f(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x) ≡ −[1−Υ(Ω(q/Λ, pˆ, x)x)]Ω(q/Λ, pˆ, x)
q/Λ
+ ρ+
θ(θ + ρ)qx
ΛΩ(q/Λ, pˆ, x)
−[1 + ex]g(1, pˆ),
h(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x) ≡ r∗ − ρ− θ(θ + ρ)qx
ΛΩ(q/Λ, pˆ, x)
+ exg(1, pˆ).
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The linearized dynamic system around the steady-state ((q/Λ)ss, pˆss, xss),
where pˆss = 1 and xss = 1 is given by:
[
q˙
q
˙ˆp
pˆ
x˙
x
]′ = A[
q
Λ
−
(
q
Λ
)
ss
pˆ− 1 x− 1]′,(15)
where [· · ·]′ denotes a column vector, and the 3 × 3 matrix A contains the
following elements:
a11 =
[
1 + epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
[fq/Λ + (
epˆ
1 + epˆ
)hq/Λ],
a12 =
[
1 + epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
[fpˆ + (
epˆ
1 + epˆ
)hpˆ],
a13 =
[
1 + epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
[fx + (
epˆ
1 + epˆ
)hx],
a21 =
[
1− eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
hq/Λ −
[
eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
fq/Λ,
a22 =
[
1− eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
hpˆ −
[
eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
fpˆ,
a23 =
[
1− eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
hx −
[
eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
fx,
a31 = 0,
a32 = gpˆ,
a33 = 0.
We have gpˆ < 0 as a real exchange rate appreciation leads to a flow decrease
of customers (so x˙ < 0 when pˆ > 1), and we can readily check that fq/Λ > 0,
hq/Λ < 0, fx > 0, and hx < 0. In conjunction with the following two as-
sumptions, we obtain signs for fpˆ and hpˆ, which provide sufficient conditions
for a unique perfect foresight path:
Assumption 1: Ceteris paribus, an increase in pˆ raises the rate of return
to holding a share in the domestic firm by raising the quasi-rent, [1 −
Υ(csx/Λ)]cs, taken as a ratio to q, by more that it decreases the rate at
which the customer base shrinks, gpˆ.
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Assumption 2: Ceteris paribus, an increase in pˆ reduces the customer’s re-
quired rate of interest through shrinking the (nonhuman) wealth to consump-
tion ratio, θ(θ + ρ)(qx/cs), by more than it increases the required interest
rate through raising the growth rate of consumption, −exgpˆ.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we also have fpˆ < 0 and hpˆ > 0. We can
then sign the elements in the matrix A as follows:
Lemma 1: a11 > 0, a12 < 0, a13 > 0, a21 < 0, a22 > 0, a23 < 0, and
a32 < 0.12
To examine stability of the above 3 × 3 dynamical system, we evaluate
its Jacobian matrix A at the steady-state equilibrium, ((q/Λ)ss, pˆss, xss),
where pˆss = 1 and xss = 1. The eigenvalues of A are the solutions of its
characteristic equation
−γ3 +Tr(A)γ2 − R(A)γ +Det(A) = 0,(16)
where the trace of A is Tr(A) ≡ a11 + a22, the determinant is Det(A) ≡
a32(a21a13− a11a23), and R(A) ≡ a11a22− a12a21− a23a32. Using Lemma 1,
we see readily that Tr(A) > 0. We now show that Det(A) < 0. Since a32 < 0,
we need to show that a21a13 − a11a23 > 0 or [(−a23)/(−a21)] > [a13/a11].
We write out explicitly the following expressions:
−a23
−a21 =
fx − (1−eq/Λeq/Λ )hx
fq/Λ − (1−eq/Λeq/Λ )hq/Λ
> 0
a13
a11
=
fx + (
epˆ
1+epˆ
)hx
fq/Λ + (
epˆ
1+epˆ
)hq/Λ
> 0.
Since [(1 − eq/Λ)/eq/Λ] > 0 > −[epˆ/(1 + epˆ)], and −a23 > 0, −a21 > 0,
a13 > 0 and a11 > 0 by Lemma 1, we have [(−a23)/(−a21)] > [a13/a11].13
12To obtain the signs of a11, a12, and a13, we use the property that f ≡ r∗ − g − [1 −
Υ](cs/q) − h and apply Assumptions 1 and 2 to obtain: a11 = −[(1 + epˆ)/((1 − eq/Λ) +
epˆ)][∂{[1−Υ](cs/q)}/∂(q/Λ)+ [1− (epˆ/(1+ epˆ))]hq/Λ] > 0, a12 = −[(1+ epˆ)/((1− eq/Λ)+
epˆ)][∂{[1 − Υ](cs/q)}/∂pˆ + gpˆ + [1 − (epˆ/(1 + epˆ))]hpˆ] < 0, and a13 = −[(1 + epˆ)/((1 −
eq/Λ) + epˆ)][∂{[1−Υ](cs/q)}/∂x+ [1− (epˆ/(1 + epˆ))]hx] > 0.
13Let a ≡ fx > 0, b ≡ −hx > 0, c ≡ fq/Λ > 0, and d ≡ −hq/Λ > 0. Also, let
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The product of the roots of the system is given by the determinant. Since
it is negative, this establishes that there are either three negative roots or
one. A necessary condition for stability of a 3× 3 system is that the trace
of the matrix A be negative. Since Tr(A) has been shown to be positive,
accordingly, the dynamic system represented by (15) is unstable, implying
it has at least one positive root. Since we know it has either zero or two
positive roots, it must have two. There is, therefore, a unique negative root,
denoted γ1, and a unique perfect foresight path that converges to the steady
state exists.14
Of the dynamic variables, the customer stock is constrained to move
continuously at all times, while the price of the share and the real exchange
rate may both jump instantaneously in response to new information. The
solution of the linearized system for the behavior of the stock of customers
is:
xt = 1− (1− x0) expγ1t,(17)
whence
x˙t = −γ1(1− xt).(18)
Corresponding to any given level of the customer base are an equilibrium
level of the real exchange rate and a share price. In particular,
pˆt = 1 +
(
γ1
gpˆ
)
(xt − 1).(19)
F ≡ [(1− eq/Λ)/eq/Λ] > 0 and G ≡ [epˆ/(1+ epˆ)] > 0. It follows that since a−Gb > 0 and
c−Gd > 0, [a+Fb]/[c+Fd] > [a−Gb]/[c−Gd] if and only if F > −G ( a condition that
is satisfied since G > 0) and bc > ad. The latter condition can be reduced to xc¸
dc¸
dx
< µ−1,
where µ is the ratio of price to marginal cost (or markup). In equilibrium, µ−1 = c¸.
Robert Hall (1988) uses value added as a measure of output and estimates the value of
µ to range from over 1.8 to a little under 4 for the seven one-digit industries he studies,
with an average value of 2.8. Using the average value of µ as a benchmark, we will require
that a one percent increase in x leads to a less than 1.8 percent rise in unit cost.
14We could also have shown that there is one negative eigenvalue and two eigenvalues
with positive real part by an application of the Routh theorem, which requires that the
number of roots of the polynomial in (16) with positive real parts be equal to the number
of variations of sign in the scheme −1 Tr(A) − R(A) + [Det(A)/Tr(A)] Det(A).
With only the sign of R(A) ambiguous but Tr(A) > 0 and Det(A) < 0, there are exactly
two changes in sign. Accordingly, there are one negative eigenvalue and two eigenvalues
with positive real parts.
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Note that (19) describes a linear relationship between pˆ and x that is posi-
tively sloped. The relationship linking share price to the stock of customers
is given by15
qt
Λ
=
(
q
Λ
)
ss
+
[(
γ1
γ1 − a11
)(
a12
a32
)
+
(
a13
γ1 − a11
)]
(xt − 1),(20)
where the terms aij can be identified as being the appropriate elements of
the matrix appearing in (15).
We note from (20) or the alternative expression appearing in footnote
(15) that the linear relationship between share price q and customer stock x
can be positively or negatively sloped. The economic intuition is that there
are two opposing forces working to affect q as we slide upwards along the
(pˆ, x) saddle path. Suppose that, beginning at an initial steady state with
xss = 1 and pˆss = 1, there is a helicopter drop of customers, so x is increased
above one. As domestic interest rate is increased as a result (on account of
an increased nonhuman wealth to consumption ratio, and an expected flow
decrease of customers, which raises the growth rate of consumption per cus-
tomer by the amount −ex[x˙/x] = −exg(1, pˆ) > 0), and an incipient capital
inflow brings about a real exchange rate appreciation, firms are induced to
reduce their markups and so increase output as competition with foreign
suppliers intensifies. This acts to raise the quasi-rent earned on each cus-
tomer, thus causing an increase in the share price q. This effect acts to give a
positive slope to the (q/Λ, x) schedule. An increase in x, however, partially
crowds out the consumer supply per customer because of rising marginal
costs. This effect tends to reduce the quasi-rent earned on each customer,
and tends to impart a negative slope to the (q/Λ, x) schedule. The effect
of a larger stock of customers on the value of the stock market is therefore
ambiguous and two cases have to be considered.
Nevertheless, we can ask whether empirical evidence can help us deter-
mine the more relevant case. As we shall see when we examine the shock
taking the form of an increase in the external real interest rate, the stock
market response on impact shows a decrease in share prices in the case of a
positive (q/Λ, x) schedule but an increase in share prices in the other case.
15We could alternatively express this relationship as: (qt/Λ) = (q/Λ)ss + [(γ1(γ1 −
a22)/(a32a21))− (a23/a21)](xt − 1).
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Since empirically, we tend to observe a decline in stock market value in, say,
Asian stock markets when the U.S. interest rate rises, it might be that the
case of a positive (q/Λ, x) schedule is empirically more relevant. The rea-
son that the stock market may theoretically rise in the small open economy
when there is an increase in the external real interest rate is that the re-
sulting real depreciation leads to an increased flow of customers gained from
foreign suppliers. Due to rising marginal costs, an increase in the growth
rate of customers gained implies a decline in the growth rate of consumption
per customer, which acts to lower the domestic rate of interest. The lower
discount rate applied to future cash flows tends to raise stock market value.
E. Analysis of Shocks
We now apply our apparatus to study the short- and medium-run effects
of four shocks: (i) an anticipation of a step-increase in the Harrod-neutral
index of productivity to occur in the future; (ii) an increase in the external
real rate of interest; (iii) a sudden permanent cut in the wage income tax;
and (iv) an anticipated future increase in the wage income tax rate required
to finance increased government outlays.
Anticipation of a future step-increase in productivity level.—Consider a
small open economy initially in steady state, which is neither a net creditor
nor a net debtor, so the real exchange rate, pˆ, equals one, and the stock
of customers buying from domestic firms include all and only nationals. At
time t0, there is news that at some time t1 in the future, the index of Harrod-
neutral productivity parameter will experience a permanent increase from
Λ0 to Λ1.
To understand the economy’s response to such a shock, it is useful to
first consider the case of an unanticipated permanent increase in Λ. As
we can observe from the system of equations given in (12) to (14), or its
linearized version given in (15), expressed in terms of the following three
variables: q/Λ, pˆ, and x, such a shock is neutral for the real exchange rate,
the real interest rate (which equals the exogenously given world real interest
rate, r∗), and the stock of customers. If the increase of productivity were
10 percent, say, share price denoted q will rise immediately by 10 percent
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(leaving q/Λ unchanged) as also will consumer expenditure and supply per
customer. The trade balance, initially equal to zero, remains unchanged.
When the same shock is expected to occur only some time in the future,
however, the share price will rise initially by less than 10 percent. With
increased financial wealth, domestic consumption demand, and hence ag-
gregate demand, increases. Such increased aggregate demand imposes an
increased domestic real interest rate, which brings about an incipient cap-
ital inflow that causes the real exchange rate to appreciate. To preserve
real interest parity, the extent of current exchange rate appreciation must
be high enough to cause an expected rate of real depreciation (− ˙ˆp/pˆ > 0)
that is equal to the interest premium, r − r∗. The stronger domestic cur-
rency increases the extent of foreign competition, resulting in domestic firms
shrinking markups and so increasing supplies and expanding employment.
As business asset valuation has also increased (q/Λ is up), the profits ac-
cruing to future customers are higher so that each firm is induced to reduce
markup on this score.16 In the short run, therefore, the small open economy
experiences a structural boom.
To study the medium-term adjustment, it is useful to develop a diagram
(see Figure 3 for the case of a positively-sloped (q/Λ, x) schedule and Figure
4 for the case of a negatively-sloped (q/Λ, x) schedule). We will focus our
discussion here by making reference only to Figure 3. It is clear that the
final rest point coinciding with the medium run analysis (point X in Figure
3) is also the original point we started the analysis with. Upon receiving
the news of a future productivity increase, pˆ jumps up from point X to
point Y in the upper panel of Figure 3, and q/Λ similarly jumps up in the
lower panel of Figure 3. At time t1 when the productivity increase actually
takes place, the economy must be back on the respective saddle paths, point
Z in the lower and upper panels of Figure 3. In the interim before the
actual productivity increase takes place, that is, in the pre-surge period,
the real exchange rate (which had initially appreciated upon receiving the
news) gradually weakens so that the algebraic flow loss of customers (recall
x˙ = g(1, pˆ)x; gpˆ < 0) also gradually falls. At a time before t1 (when the
productivity increase actually takes place), the real exchange rate in fact
falls below one and the economy begins to regain customers ahead of the
16This result is obtained whether the (q/Λ, x) schedule is positively or negatively sloped.
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actual productivity increase. Meanwhile, the stock market enjoys a bull
run. What happens to employment in the interim before t1? We see that
employment, which had jumped up initially, continues to be pulled up by
a rising share price (relative to the productivity parameter) but gradually
pulled down by a gradual end to the real appreciation, and by the loss of
customers.
What is unambiguous is what happens to employment at t1 when the
productivity increase actually materializes? Employment at that point must
experience an abrupt decline (so the unemployment rate suddenly jumps up)
as an unchanged output is now produced by a smaller number of workers. In
fact, at point Z in the upper and lower panels of Figure 3, which corresponds
to the arrival of the productivity surge, employment must be below the initial
level. Consequently, a structural slump takes place in the post-surge period
although recovery gradually takes place as market share is regained that
was lost to foreign suppliers in the pre-surge period. At the medium-run
rest point, employment is back to where it was originally so the recovery is
complete. We leave it to the reader to trace the implied path of employment
corresponding to the dynamics shown in Figure 4.
An increase in the external real interest rate.—To analyze what happens
to the small open economy in response to the rise of the external real interest
rate, it is useful to state the conditions satisfied in the medium-run steady
state. The relevant equations are:[
1 +
η(1)
η′(1)
−Υ(c
sx
Λ
)
]
= −( q
cs
)
(
g1(1, 1) + pˆg2(1, 1)
η′(1)
)
; η(1) = 1,(21)
r∗ =
[1−Υ( csxΛ )]cs
q
,(22)
r∗ = ρ+ θ(θ + ρ)
(
qx
cs
)
,(23)
where use has been made of the fact that in the steady state, r = r∗ and
pˆ = 1. Equation (21) gives us our consumer supply equation, (22) states the
equality between the rate of return to holding a share and the world real
interest rate, and (23) states the equality between the world real interest rate
and the consumer’s required rate of interest. This is a system of equations
in the three variables, q/cs, cs/Λ and x.
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From (21), we note that csx/Λ is a monotone increasing function of q/cs
as an increase in the latter induces firms to reduce their markups and hence
increase output. Substituting out for csx/Λ in (22) using this function, we
see that q/cs is uniquely pinned down by the external rate of interest, r∗. In
particular, an increase in r∗ reduces q/cs and causes firms to increase their
markups. Using this result in (23), we can infer that in the medium-run
steady state, an increase in r∗ reduces q/cs and necessitates a rise in x to
equate the consumer’s required rate of interest to the now higher external
interest rate.
The sudden increase in the external real rate of interest above domes-
tic interest rate causes an outflow of capital, which leads to an immediate
real depreciation. As domestic firms are shielded from foreign competition,
they are induced to raise their markups and shrink supplies. Consequently,
employment falls on this account. If we take the empirically relevant case
of a decline in business asset valuation in response to a higher external real
interest rate, there is a further cutback on firms’ supplies as firms’ reduced
valuation of an additional customer induces them to raise their markups,
raising profits in the near term. This case is depicted in Figure 5.17
How does employment adjust in the medium term? As market share is
gradually increased, employment slowly recovers. Furthermore, the recovery
is aided by a gradual appreciation as the real exchange rate slowly increases
back to the value of one, and the share price, q slowly recovers in the empir-
ically relevant case. But will the recovery be complete in the sense that at
the medium-run rest point, employment is back to the pre-shock level? The
answer is no, so the rise in external real interest rate permanently raises the
equilibrium rate of unemployment. To see this, recall that we have shown
above that in the medium-run steady state, q/cs, is reduced as a result of
a higher r∗. This implies that csx/Λ ≡ ²(1 − u) is decreased as firms raise
17If the (q/Λ, x) schedule is negatively sloped (not shown), it is implied that q initially
jumps up. This is because the real depreciation (decline in pˆ from a value of one) causes
x˙, which was originally zero, to turn positive as overseas customers are gained. Since an
increase in x causes the amount of consumer supply per customer to decline due to rising
marginal costs, the domestic interest rate is reduced by the amount ex[x˙/x] ≡ exg(1, pˆ) > 0
as pˆ falls below one. The lower discount rate applied to future profits increases the
valuation of a customer and acts to offset the tendency for q to decrease on account of
reduced quasi-rents per customer, [1−Υ]cs, brought about by a real depreciation.
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their markups permanently. A plot of the employment rate time path shows
that it is permanently shifted down. We also take note that q (equivalently
q/Λ as Λ here is held fixed) also does not fully recover back to its original
level. To see this, we write
q
Λ
≡
(
1
x
)(
q
cs
)(
csx
Λ
)
.
Noting that the last bracketed term, csx/Λ is monotone increasing in q/cs,
it is clear that a rise in r∗ leads to a fall in q/Λ in the medium-run steady
state since x is increased and q/cs is decreased.
A sudden permanent reduction in wage income tax rate.—To study the
effects of a permanent cut in the wage income tax rate, let us now suppose
that initially a wage income tax is applied to finance a lump-sum transfer
that the worker receives from the government whether or not he is or will
be employed. Let the amount of the lump-sum transfer per member of
the labor force be equal to ys. The real wage in terms of domestic output
received by the worker, vh, is related to the labor cost to the firm of a
worker, vf , by vf ≡ (1 + τ)vh, τ being the proportional payroll tax rate.
Our nonwage income, yw, now includes a positive level of the government
transfer.18 Solving the cost minimization problem of the firm now leads to
the supply-wage locus:
vh
yw
= Φ(1− u); Φ′(1− u) > 0.(24)
With yw now including a positive level of government transfer, we now
have the accounting relationship yw−ys+(1−u)vf ≡ Λ²[1−u]. Using (24)
in this accounting relationship, we derive
yw ≡ Λ²[1− u] + y
s
1 + (1− u)(1 + τ)Φ(1− u) ,
whence the unit cost, c¸, can be written as
unit cost ≡ v
f
Λ²
= Φ(1− u)
[
(1− u) + ( ysΛ²)
(1 + τ)−1 + (1− u)Φ(1− u)
]
.(25)
18In the basic model studied above, we had assumed for the sake of simplicity zero taxes
and transfers.
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With balanced budget, the level of government transfer per member of the
labor force is related to the payroll tax rate, τ , by
τvh(1− u) ≡
(
τ
1 + τ
)
vf (1− u) = ys.(26)
Using the government budget constraint given in (26), we can obtain, after
some tedious steps, an expression for ys/(Λ²) appearing in (25):
ys
Λ²
= τ(1− u)
[
(1− u)Φ(1− u)
1 + (1− u)Φ(1− u)
]
.(27)
Using (27) to substitute out for ys/(Λ²) in (25), we see that at given
employment rate, 1 − u, a balanced-budget reduction in the payroll tax
rate, τ , reduces the unit cost, c¸. On the proviso made earlier that in-
creased output would require increased employment, we establish that c¸=
Υ(csx/Λ, τ); Υ1 > 0; Υ2 > 0.
The set of conditions representing the medium-run steady state with
a positive payroll tax, which finances a government transfer in a balanced
budget manner, is represented by[
1 +
η(1)
η′(1)
−Υ(c
sx
Λ
, τ)
]
= −( q
cs
)
(
g1(1, 1) + pˆg2(1, 1)
η′(1)
)
; η(1) = 1,(28)
r∗ =
[1−Υ( csxΛ , τ)]cs
q
,(29)
r∗ = ρ+ θ(θ + ρ)
(
qx
cs
)
.(30)
Suppose that the small open economy, initially in a steady state with payroll
tax rate equal to τ0, imposes a permanent tax cut with the payroll tax rate
reduced to τ1, τ1 < τ0, and lump-sum transfers are correspondingly reduced
to balance the budget. We see from (28) and (29) that such a permanent tax
cut leaves q/cs unchanged from its initial level and hence the equilibrium
markup unaffected. The reason is that as a result of the tax cut, the unit
cost is reduced at any given level of a firm’s output (equivalently, at a given
rate of employment) as workers are encouraged to put in more work effort
or to shirk less on account of a higher take-home pay relative to nonwage
income. (In effect, the tax cut shifts down the wage curve in the (vf , 1− u)
plane.) The increased work incentive, at any employment rate, means that
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firms’ profits are up, which leads to increased hiring. Normal profits are
restored only when the increased employment and consequent increase in
each firm’s output pulls up unit cost back to its original level.
From (30), we see that with q/cs unchanged, the stock of customers, x,
is also unchanged. Since we know that employment jumps up, consumer
supply per customer, cs must have increased. We want to prove that con-
sumer demand per customer cd, which was equal to consumer supply per
customer cs initially, must jump up by exactly the same amount. Note that
in the Blanchard-Yaari set-up, consumer demand per customer is given by
cd = (θ + ρ)[H +W ], where H is human wealth and W ≡ qx is financial
wealth. Now, human wealth can, at the initial steady state, be expressed as
H = [(vh(1 − u)/(r∗ + θ)) + (ys/(r∗ + θ))]. Using the government budget
constraint, τvh(1 − u) = ys, and the relation vf ≡ (1 + τ)vh, allows us to
write human wealth as H = vf (1 − u)/(r∗ + θ). Dividing and multiplying
by Λ² allows us to express H in terms of unit cost, c¸= Υ(csx/Λ, τ), that
is, H = Υ(csx/Λ, τ)csx/(r∗ + θ). Consequently, we can express consumer
demand per customer as
cd = (θ + ρ)
[
Υ( c
sx
Λ , τ)c
sx
r∗ + θ
+ qx
]
.(31)
Recall that the tax cut leaves the unit cost unchanged, and q increases
by the same proportion as cs increases, since q/cs is unchanged. With x
unchanged, if cd equals cs initially, it must rise by the same proportion as cs
rises. The end result is that employment is expanded without a need for any
real exchange rate adjustment since human wealth and financial wealth rise
by the same proportion to cause consumer demand per customer to rise and
match the higher consumer supply brought about by increased employment.
As Figure 6 shows, q/Λ jumps up with no change in x and pˆ.
An anticipated future increase in the wage income tax rate required to
finance future increased entitlement spending.—At time t0, there is news
that at some time t1 in the future, the tax rate τ will be increased to finance
increased entitlement spending. Applying the same set of equations (28) to
(30) developed in the preceding sub-section, we see now that an increase in
τ required to pay for increased ys leaves q/cs unchanged. However, with an
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increase in τ causing output to decline due to the negative incentive effect
on work effort, the medium-run steady-state q is proportionately reduced.
In anticipation of a reduced q some time in the future, there is an immediate
decline in q followed by a gradual fall. Noting that the immediate decline
in q and its further erosion acts to decrease the domestic real interest rate,
we see that the market’s anticipation of a future increase in the wage in-
come tax rate required to finance the increased entitlement spending leads
immediately to an incipient capital outflow.19 The current real exchange
rate must therefore immediately depreciate far enough to generate a rate
of anticipated real exchange rate appreciation equal to the gap between the
external and domestic real interest rate (see Figure 7). The economy there-
fore generates a trade surplus, gaining market share abroad. At time t1
when the fiscal expansion actually occurs, the real exchange rate is at its
strongest and the economy’s rate of loss of market share is at its greatest.
Subsequently, the real exchange rate returns to one.
III. The Long Run
For a medium-run analysis, we held nationals’ holdings of net foreign
assets constant. Now, we introduce explicitly into our analysis another vari-
able, the private holdings of net foreign assets, denoted F , which we allow to
adjust to economic conditions. Like the stock of customers, x, the holding
of net foreign assets, F , is a slow-moving variable. Around the steady state,
where the economy is initially neither a net creditor nor a net debtor so
F = 0, an additional equation to be introduced (in terms of the unit cost
c¸= Υ(csx/Λ) and supposing zero taxes and government transfers) is
W˙ = rW +Υ(
csx
Λ
)csx− cd; W ≡ F + qx.(32)
We focus on the steady state and we are interested to ask how the em-
ployment rate, 1−u, and the level of net foreign assets, F , behave in the long
run. Once we allow explicitly for the level of net foreign assets to adjust,
it turns out convenient to use the Blanchard-Yaari equation, which can be
19Recall from footnote 11 that we can write the domestic interest rate as: r = ρ+ θ(θ+
ρ)(qx/cs) + eq/Λ(q˙/q) + epˆ( ˙ˆp/pˆ) + exg(1, pˆ).
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expressed as r∗ = ρ + θ(θ + ρ)W/cd. Using the consumption function used
earlier, and the definition of human wealth, we obtain
r∗ = ρ+
θ
1 +
(
v
yw
)
(1− u)
; yw ≡ (r∗ + θ)(F + qx).(33)
Note that nonwage income, yw, includes interest earnings (payments) on
net foreign assets. Using (33), we obtain a relationship between v/yw and
1 − u that is a hyperbola in Figure 8. Along such a schedule, the level of
net foreign assets adjusts to achieve capital market equilibrium. The other
positively-sloped schedule describes labor-market equilibrium and is given
by (3). Their intersection determines the long-run employment rate, 1-u.
Algebraically, to determine long-run employment we can substitute out for
v/yw in (33) using (3) to obtain:
r∗ = ρ+
θ
1 + Φ(1− u)(1− u) .(34)
To determine the long-run level of net foreign assets holding, we use the
relationship
F
Λ
=
[
r∗ − ρ
(r∗ + θ)(θ + ρ− r∗)
] [
csx
Λ
]
Υ(
csx
Λ
)−
[
qx
Λ
]
.(35)
Equation (34) tells us straightforwardly that if the economy starts off ini-
tially at the long-run steady-state position, the productivity shock leaves the
employment rate unaffected in the long run even after holdings of net foreign
assets have fully adjusted. The long-run natural rate of unemployment is
neutral to the anticipated surge of productivity even though unemployment
adjusts in the short and medium run. From (21) and (22), which continue
to apply in the long run, q/cs is unchanged. Using this result in (35) shows
that with F = 0 initially, the small open economy returns to that position in
the long run. Thus the economy runs a deficit on its trade balance initially
as consumption jumps up in anticipation of the future surge in productiv-
ity. At some stage, however, the trade balance moves into surplus in such a
way that its present value equals the present discounted value of the trade
deficits incurred.
Equation (34) also tells us that a higher external rate of real interest
leaves the natural rate of unemployment higher in the long run after holdings
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of net foreign assets have fully adjusted. (In terms of Figure 8, an increase
in r∗ shifts the downward-sloping schedule towards the origin.) Hence the
employment rate never fully recovers even in the long run. As to the level of
net foreign assets holding in the long run, an examination of (35) tells us that
it is ambiguous. The increase of r∗ reduces both qx and ²[1− u] ≡ csx/Λ.
What about the long-run effects of the permanent wage income tax cut
after holdings of net foreign assets have fully adjusted? From (28) and
(29), which continue to apply to the long run, q/cs is unchanged, so the
equilibrium markup is unchanged. This implies that each firm’s output and
employment expand. To see that the holding of net foreign assets, which was
zero to begin with remains at zero, we write the Blanchard-Yaari equation
as follows:
r∗ = ρ+
θ
1 + Υ(
csx
Λ
,τ)
(r∗+θ)( qcs+ Fcsx)
.(36)
We see from (36) that since the permanent tax cut leaves unit cost unchanged
and q/cs unchanged, if F were initially zero, it remains at zero. Hence the
permanent wage income tax cut leaves the natural rate of unemployment
permanently lower in the long run.
IV. Concluding Remarks
We suggest that standard versions of Keynesian and neoclassical theories
applied to the open economy have difficulty in explaining some of the main
events of the past few decades and the recent dollar weakening and U.S.
employment decline. It is possible that the new open economy macroeco-
nomics (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Philip Lane, 2001) will have better ex-
planatory power. Our approach in this paper, however, has been to develop
a structuralist model that is based on different theoretical underpinnings
to explain these major events. Although we retain some fairly standard
assumptions—perfect international capital mobility, rational expectations,
prominence of demands and a Q theory of investments—the propagation
mechanism through which shocks work their effects is different from those
found in Keynesian and neoclassical approaches. With trading frictions in
the goods market (Phelps and Winter, 1970 and Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000),
shifts in demand, such as shifts in consumer demand and shifts in govern-
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ment purchase of labor or the consumption good, affect employment through
supply-side effects of the real interest rate, real exchange rate, and business
asset prices. The path of the natural rate of unemployment is displaced as a
result. The structuralist model is analytically more complex as the dimen-
sionality of the problem increases with the addition of new state variables.
Yet, we believe that the gain in economic insight from further development
of the structuralist approach is huge.
Notwithstanding the increased complexity of our analysis, we suggest
that the essence of the model’s predictions of the responses to the major
shocks of the past few decades can be conveyed intuitively. Consider the
shock experienced in the U.S. in the second half of the ’90s, which we liken
to the sudden expectation of a future surge in productivity. In our theory,
this anticipation causes a boom in the stock market, which drives up con-
sumer demand and domestic interest rate. An incipient capital inflow leads
to an appreciation of the real exchange rate and a worsening trade balance.
Because domestic firms then face stiffer competition from foreign suppli-
ers, they are induced to reduce their markups, and consequently expand
output and employment. On top of this, the increased valuation of busi-
ness assets means that profits from future customers are high so that each
firm lowers its current price and increases supply. The resulting economic
boom is non-inflationary. Our theory also suggests that fiscal shocks—in
the form of tax changes and welfare entitlements—have first-order effects
on the supply side. The Kennedy permanent income tax cut produced an
expansion of employment without any real appreciation largely because the
wage-incentive effect on workers’ behavior increased employment and hence
output to match the increased consumption stimulated by the tax cut. The
increase in the external real interest rate in the ’80s facing the European
economies caused an outflow of capital and brought about a real exchange
rate depreciation there. Being shielded from foreign competition, European
firms raised their markups and cut back supplies, consequently contracting
employment.
Our model also bears on the present-day dollar weakness and the large
U.S. trade deficit. On its postulate of correct expectations the model pre-
dicts that if the pension and medical benefit overhang is far less resolved in
the U.S. than in Europe, the dollar must be extraordinarily weak vis a` vis
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the euro in order to deliver the exports and choke off the imports required to
generate the trade surpluses during the run-up to the future entitlement ex-
plosion in order to create a cushion of overseas assets with which to finance
trade deficits during the surge of entitlement benefits. But if in contrast
households are in expectational disequilibrium, failing to understand that
tax increases lie ahead or cuts in benefits or both, the model suggests that
the trade balance will continue in deficit—thanks to household spending
inflated by false expectations and helped along by a dollar that will not
weaken much more as long as households remain in disequilibrium. (Of
course, the American housing boom is also fuelled by a monetary policy
of keeping short-term interest rates well below their “neutral” levels, which
has had the effect of keeping long rates below the neutral level too.) It is
interesting that market participants operate on the contrary belief that a
return to fiscal sanity will strengthen the dollar. In our model, to repeat,
once expectations shift closer to reality, we will see markedly decreased con-
sumption, thus an improved trade balance and a much weaker dollar. It
may be added that the longer U.S. policy makers wait to get back to reality
the greater the correction will have to be. In denying the need for tax hikes
or benefit cuts, the government is staving off a further decline of the dollar
at the price of the greater decline later when people finally catch on.
Appendix
1. The Dornbusch-Mundell-Fleming model can be described by the following
pair of equations (see Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, pp. 537-42):
dY
dt
= α[A(Y, I¯, G− T, EP
∗
P
)− Y ], α > 0,
dE
dt
= [r(
M
P
,Y )− r∗]E,
where Y is output, I¯ is the exogenous component of investment demand, G
is government purchases, T is the tax net of government transfer payments,
E is nominal exchange rate (defined as number of units of domestic currency
per unit of foreign currency), P ∗ is foreign price level, P is domestic price
level, r is domestic interest rate (made a function of the real stock of money
supply and output through the LM relation),M is domestic nominal money
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stock and r∗ is foreign interest rate. Assuming that 0 < ∂A/∂Y < 1 allows
us to characterize a saddle-path stable system in the (Y,EP ∗/P ) plane.
2. The competitive neoclassical model for the small open economy can be
described by the following equations:
Y = F (K,ΛN),
v = ΛF2(K,ΛN),
r∗ = F1(K,ΛN),
N = η(v, λ),
where the production function is constant returns to scale in physical capital
(K) and effective labor (ΛN), v is the real wage, r∗ is the exogenously given
external real rate of interest, andN = η(v, λ) gives the labor supply in Frisch
form, with λ being the marginal utility of wealth (see a use of the Frisch
form of labor supply in Woodford, 1994). Labor supply is increasing in the
real wage, and assuming normal goods, is also increasing in the marginal
utility of wealth.
3. The dynamics of the 4 × 4 system of the small open economy can be
described by the behavior of the endogenous variables q/Λ, pˆ, x and F ,
where F is the stock of net foreign assets, after substituting out for cs/Λ
using cs/Λ = Ω(q/Λ, pˆ, x):(
q˙
q
)
=
[
1 + epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
f(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x, F ) +
[
epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
h(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x, F ),(
˙ˆp
pˆ
)
=
[
1− eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
h(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x, F )−
[
eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
f(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x, F ),(
x˙
x
)
= g(1, pˆ),
F˙ = rF + (x− 1 + g(1, pˆ)x)c∗,
where
f(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x, F ) ≡ −[1−Υ(Ω(q/Λ, pˆ, x)x)]Ω(q/Λ, pˆ, x)
q/Λ
+ ρ+
θ(θ + ρ)(qx+ F )
ΛΩ(q/Λ, pˆ, x)
−[1 + ex]g(1, pˆ),
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h(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x, F ) ≡ r∗ − ρ− θ(θ + ρ)(qx+ F )
ΛΩ(q/Λ, pˆ, x)
+ exg(1, pˆ),
r = r∗ −
[
1− eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
h(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x, F ) +
[
eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
f(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x, F ),
and c∗ is the exogenously given level of consumption (measured in units of
the domestic good) per foreign customer.
The linearized dynamic system around the steady-state ((q/Λ)ss, pˆss, xss, Fss),
where pˆss = 1, xss = 1 and Fss = 0, is given by:
[
q˙
q
˙ˆp
pˆ
x˙
x
F˙ ]′ = A[
q
Λ
−
(
q
Λ
)
ss
pˆ− 1 x− 1 F ]′,
where [· · ·]′ denotes a column vector, and the 4 × 4 matrix A contains the
following elements:
a11 =
[
1 + epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
[fq/Λ + (
epˆ
1 + epˆ
)hq/Λ],
a12 =
[
1 + epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
[fpˆ + (
epˆ
1 + epˆ
)hpˆ],
a13 =
[
1 + epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
[fx + (
epˆ
1 + epˆ
)hx],
a14 =
[
1 + epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
[fF + (
epˆ
1 + epˆ
)hF ],
a21 =
[
1− eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
hq/Λ −
[
eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
fq/Λ,
a22 =
[
1− eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
hpˆ −
[
eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
fpˆ,
a23 =
[
1− eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
hx −
[
eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
fx,
a24 =
[
1− eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
hF −
[
eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
fF ,
a31 = 0,
a32 = gpˆ,
a33 = 0,
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a34 = 0,
a41 = 0,
a42 = gpˆc∗xss,
a43 = c∗,
a44 = r∗.
We have gpˆ < 0 as a real exchange rate appreciation leads to a flow de-
crease of customers (so x˙ < 0 when pˆ > 1), and we can readily check that
fq/Λ > 0, hq/Λ < 0, fx > 0, and hx < 0. Under Assumptions 1 and 2,
we also have fpˆ < 0 and hpˆ > 0. Assuming a positive external real rate of
interest, a44 > 0. We can then sign the elements in the matrix A as follows:
Lemma A1: a11 > 0, a12 < 0, a13 > 0, a14 > 0, a21 < 0, a22 > 0, a23 < 0,
a24 < 0, a32 < 0, a42 < 0, a43 > 0 and a44 > 0.
Let the eigenvalues of the system be given by λi with i = 1, 2, 3, 4. We
can readily check that the determinant (equal to λ1λ2λ3λ4 ≡ a21a32a43a14) is
unambiguously positive so there are either four positive roots or two positive
roots plus two negative roots. Under the assumption that λ1λ2λ3+λ1λ2λ4+
λ2λ3λ4+λ1λ3λ4 ≡ a32(a43a24−a23a44)+a32(a21a13−a11a23)+a44(a11a22−
a12a21)+a42(a14a21−a11a24) < 0, we rule out the case of four positive roots.
As a result, the system will have two negative roots and two positive roots.
To study the exact path of convergence towards the steady state, we
can resort to the method of dominant eigenvalue proposed by Calvo (1987).
Suppose that λ1 and λ2 are the two negative roots. Furthermore, assume
that λ1 is the dominant eigenvalue, that is, λ1 > λ2. This implies that the
system will converge to a ray which is associated with λ1. Let the eigenvector
associated with λ1 be given by [1 x21 x31 x41]′. We obtain the system of
equations:
λ1 − a11 − a12x21 − a13x31 − a14x41 = 0,
−a21 + (λ1 − a22)x21 − a23x31 − a24x41 = 0,
−a32x21 + λ1x31 = 0,
−a42x21 − a43x31 + (λ1 − a44)x41 = 0.
36
Noting that x21/x31 = λ1/a32 > 0, we can draw a diagram like the top panel
of Figure 3 (with pˆ represented on the vertical axis and x represented on
the horizontal axis) showing now a positively-sloped asymptotic adjustment
path between the real exchange rate and the stock of customers. Noting
that the sign of 1/x31 is ambiguous, the slope of the asymptotic adjustment
path between q/Λ and the stock of customers is also ambiguous. Applying
this apparatus to study the four shocks discussed in the main text leaves
the basic results intact.
4. For a large open economy, we make the external real interest rate, r∗,
a decreasing function of the level of net foreign assets, F , that is, we set
r∗ = ψ(F ); ψ′(F ) < 0. We also impose the condition that−Fψ′(F )/ψ(F ) <
1. The dynamics of the system can be described by the behavior of the
endogenous variables q/Λ, pˆ, x and F , where F is the stock of net foreign
assets, after substituting out for cs/Λ using cs/Λ = Ω(q/Λ, pˆ, x):(
q˙
q
)
=
[
1 + epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
f(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x, F ) +
[
epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
h(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x, F ),(
˙ˆp
pˆ
)
=
[
1− eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
h(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x, F )−
[
eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
f(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x, F ),(
x˙
x
)
= g(1, pˆ),
F˙ = rF + (x− 1 + g(1, pˆ)x)c∗,
where
f(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x, F ) ≡ −[1−Υ(Ω(q/Λ, pˆ, x)x)]Ω(q/Λ, pˆ, x)
q/Λ
+ ρ+
θ(θ + ρ)(qx+ F )
ΛΩ(q/Λ, pˆ, x)
−[1 + ex]g(1, pˆ),
h(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x, F ) ≡ ψ(F )− ρ− θ(θ + ρ)(qx+ F )
ΛΩ(q/Λ, pˆ, x)
+ exg(1, pˆ),
r = ψ(F )−
[
1− eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
h(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x, F ) +
[
eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
f(
q
Λ
, pˆ, x, F ),
and c∗ is the exogenously given level of consumption (measured in units of
the domestic good) per foreign customer.
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The linearized dynamic system around the steady-state ((q/Λ)ss, pˆss, xss, Fss),
where pˆss = 1, xss = 1 and Fss = 0, is given by:
[
q˙
q
˙ˆp
pˆ
x˙
x
F˙ ]′ = A[
q
Λ
−
(
q
Λ
)
ss
pˆ− 1 x− 1 F ]′,
where [· · ·]′ denotes a column vector, and the 4 × 4 matrix A contains the
following elements:
a11 =
[
1 + epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
[fq/Λ + (
epˆ
1 + epˆ
)hq/Λ],
a12 =
[
1 + epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
[fpˆ + (
epˆ
1 + epˆ
)hpˆ],
a13 =
[
1 + epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
[fx + (
epˆ
1 + epˆ
)hx],
a14 =
[
1 + epˆ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
[fF + (
epˆ
1 + epˆ
)hF ],
a21 =
[
1− eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
hq/Λ −
[
eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
fq/Λ,
a22 =
[
1− eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
hpˆ −
[
eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
fpˆ,
a23 =
[
1− eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
hx −
[
eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
fx,
a24 =
[
1− eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
hF −
[
eq/Λ
(1− eq/Λ) + epˆ
]
fF ,
a31 = 0,
a32 = gpˆ,
a33 = 0,
a34 = 0,
a41 = 0,
a42 = gpˆc∗xss,
a43 = c∗,
a44 = ψ(0).
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We have gpˆ < 0 as a real exchange rate appreciation leads to a flow decrease
of customers (so x˙ < 0 when pˆ > 1), and we can readily check that fq/Λ > 0,
hq/Λ < 0, fx > 0, and hx < 0. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we also have
fpˆ < 0 and hpˆ > 0. Assuming a positive external real rate of interest when
F = 0, that is, ψ(0) > 0, we have a44 > 0. The signs of the coefficients
are then as in lemma A1 so we can establish a system that will have two
positive and two negative roots.
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  Figure 1. Employment and the stock market   
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           Source: Hoon, Phelps and Zoega (2005) 
 
       
 
Figure 2. Employment and real exchange rates                      
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Figure 3: Response to anticipated future step-increase in Λ 
               (case of positively-sloped (q/ Λ,x) schedule)  
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Figure 4: Response to anticipated future step-increase in Λ 
               (case of negatively-sloped (q/ Λ,x) schedule)  
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Figure 5: Response to a rise in r* 
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Figure 6: Response to an unanticipated permanent wage income tax cut 
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Figure 7: Response to anticipated future increase in τ 
               (case of negatively-sloped (q/ Λ,x) schedule)  
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Figure 8: Long-run determination of employment 
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